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Mistake of fact or mistake of criminal law? 
Explaining and defending the distinction 
by 
Kenneth W. Simons* 
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Abstract: 
 This article makes six points.  First, under any plausible normative perspective, the 
distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and mistake of fact must at least 
sometimes be drawn.  Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about the 
state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about whether 
that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”).  Third, when an actor 
makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has discretion to 
elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a jurisdiction’s 
policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently.  Fourth, the claim that every unreasonable 
M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of mistake.  
Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the famous Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not 
undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine 
counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction 
ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule.  
Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent 
in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law.  This 
phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; 
to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction. 
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Introduction 
 
 The complexities of ignorance and mistake of fact and of law in criminal law 
doctrine and theory are legion.  How do we distinguish fact from law?  Is it worth drawing 
the distinction?  Is the distinction equally significant for exculpatory mistakes (potentially 
resulting in acquittal of the completed crime) and for inculpatory ones (potentially resulting 
in attempt liability)? 
 Contemporary criminal law draws a firm distinction between fact and law for 
purposes of both exculpation and inculpation.  Moreover, as we will see, all of the major 
normative perspectives on the proper scope of a defense of ignorance or mistake of criminal 
law agree that the law/fact distinction should at least sometimes be preserved. 
 Yet some have objected that the distinction is incoherent or misguided.  These 
objections are serious.  In my effort to defuse them, I hope to demonstrate how we should 
draw the distinction in the particular context of criminal liability, why the distinction matters, 
and why it is sometimes especially treacherous. 
 To set the stage, I begin with four problems or conundra. 
 First consider the problem of evaluative criteria.  Suppose a defendant uses marijuana 
to relieve a medical condition, and asserts the necessity defense as a defense to prosecution 
for illegal drug possession.  And suppose his defense is rejected.  Was it rejected because he 
misunderstood the legal standard that the fact-finder applied in judging what counts as a 
lesser evil?  (Perhaps the jury believed that urgent medical need can never justify use of 
marijuana.)  Or because the fact-finder rejected his factual claims?  (Perhaps the jury believed 
that his medical problem was not sufficiently serious to be an urgent medical need.)  If the 
jurisdiction requires the jury to apply a more demanding standard when excusing for mistakes 
of law than when excusing for mistakes of fact, yet we do not know the basis of the jury’s 
rejection of his claim, how can we determine whether it acted lawfully? 
 Second, consider the question of how to characterize an unreasonable mistake of 
fact—for example, a defendant’s unreasonable assessment of the facts about the victim’s age, 
where the crime forbids sexual intercourse with a person younger than a particular age.  The 
determination that such a mistake is “unreasonable” is, in an important sense, a legal 
judgment.  Does that mean that the distinction between mistakes of law (about the governing 
legal norm) and mistakes of fact (about whether defendant’s actual conduct instantiates that 
norm) is, at least in this category of cases, misguided? 
 Third, the evolution of criminal law standards seems to magically convert mistakes of 
fact into mistakes of law.  Consider the dramatic recent transformation of actus reus and mens 
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rea standards concerning nonconsent in rape law.  A number of jurisdictions have not only 
rejected stringent resistance requirements; they have also, roughly speaking, moved from 
“NO means NO” to “Only YES means YES.”  That is, only an affirmative expression of 
willingness to engage in the act of intercourse suffices as legal consent in these jurisdictions.  
Suppose a defendant, unaware of this new legal requirement, has intercourse with a victim 
who does not affirmatively express such willingness, but who does not verbally or physically 
protest.  Has he made a mistake of fact or law about her nonconsent?  Does the law care 
which kind of mistake he made?  Should it care? 
 Finally, consider the fact/ law distinction in a different context, inculpatory mistakes. 
Under the modern consensus, the distinction matters a great deal in deciding what types of 
“impossible” attempts warrant attempt liability: 
(1)  A defendant can be guilty even if the attempt is “factually impossible” (i.e., the 
actual facts are such that it was impossible for him to commit a crime).  Suppose D1, 
while hunting out of season, shoots at what he believes is a live deer, but he is 
actually shooting at a stuffed deer.  He is guilty of the attempt to hunt out of season. 
(2)  But a defendant cannot be found guilty if the attempt is truly “legally impossible” 
(i.e., if, had the facts been as he believed them to be, he would not be committing a 
crime).  Suppose that D2 knows that he is shooting at a live deer, but he incorrectly 
believes that the state prohibits all hunting of deer, when actually the state permits 
deer hunting. 
 Yet this modern consensus is challenged by a famous example from Sandy Kadish, 
Mr. Fact/Mr. Law.  The example seems to demonstrate that the fact/ law distinction should 
make no difference to attempt liability. 
 
Mr. Fact and Mr. Law 
Mr. Fact and Mr. Law both set out independently to get a jump on the bow-hunting 
season by sneaking out a day before the season begins.  For technical reasons, the exact 
date of the state’s bow-hunting season for deer tends to change from year to year, but 
[the] date this year is Friday, October 15.  Ironically, Messrs. Fact and Law each make 
a mistake that results in their stalking and killing deer on what they mistakenly believe 
to be the day before the hunting season but is actually the first day of the season itself 
(Friday, October 15).  Mr. Fact makes the factual mistake of thinking, “Today is 
Thursday, October 14.”  Mr. Law makes the legal mistake of thinking, “The season 
begins on Saturday, October 16.” While each is butchering his deer carcass, he is each 
approached by a game warden who intends to congratulate him.  Instead, Mr. Fact and 
Mr. Law both confess, thinking they have been caught red-handed while hunting out of 
season.1 
                                                 
1 Westen (2008: 536-537) (offering his own version of the famous example). 
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Under the modern consensus, which rejects the defense of factual impossibility but accepts 
the defense of “true” legal impossibility, Mr. Fact is guilty of attempt, while Mr. Law is not.  
But is this tenable?  Is there really any good reason to convict one but not the other? 
 In this essay, I will try to show the following.  First, under any plausible normative 
perspective, the distinction between mistake (and ignorance) of criminal law and of fact must 
at least sometimes be drawn.  Second, the fundamental distinction is between a mistake about 
the state’s authoritative statement of what is prohibited (“M Law”), and a mistake about 
whether that prohibitory norm is instantiated in a particular case (“M Fact”).  Third, when an 
actor makes a mistake about an evaluative criterion whose content the fact-finder has 
discretion to elaborate, it is impossible both to allow this discretion and to faithfully realize a 
jurisdiction’s policy of treating M Fact and M Law differently.  Fourth, the claim that every 
unreasonable M Fact is really a M Law elides important differences between the two kinds of 
mistake.  Fifth, various borderline objections, such as the Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example, do not 
undermine the fundamental distinction, although in rare instances, they do constitute genuine 
counterexamples that do not effectuate the principles and policies that the distinction 
ordinarily serves; and even here, they are exceptions that prove (the rationale for) the rule.  
Sixth, specification or evolution of a criminal law norm, such as the criterion for nonconsent 
in rape law, can convert a legally relevant M Fact into a legally irrelevant M Law.  This 
phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction between these types of mistake; 
to the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction. 
 
I.   Current doctrine: mistake of fact (“M Fact”) v. mistake of criminal law (“M Law”) 
 
 Let us begin with the basic doctrinal picture, which depicts how ignorance and 
mistake of fact and law are relevant under modern American criminal law.2  Sometimes they 
are potentially exculpatory (even though the actor has satisfied the actus reus of the crime), 
and sometimes potentially inculpatory, i.e. they potentially warrant attempt liability (even 
though the actor has not satisfied the actus reus of the crime). 
 Suppose it is illegal knowingly to sell a cigarette to a person under the age of 
eighteen.  And assume that the mens rea requirement of “knowledge” applies to all the 
material elements of the offense.  Here are four scenarios that illustrate the modern approach. 
 
                                                 
2 By “modern criminal law,” I mean the Model Penal Code, statutory revisions following the MPC, and the 
contemporary American academic consensus on these issues. 
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1.  Adam 
 
Adam, owner of a convenience store, sells a cigarette to Vicky, who is seventeen.  
Because she appears to be older than seventeen and presents a phony identification 
card indicating that she is nineteen, Adam believes that she is nineteen. 
 
Adam is not guilty; his mistake of fact  (“M Fact”) is exculpatory, negating the requisite 
culpability, that he know or, more precisely, believe,3 that the recipient is under the age of 
eighteen. 
  
2.  Boris 
 
Boris, owner of a convenience store, sells a cigarette to Vicky, who is nineteen.  
Because she appears to be younger than nineteen and presents an identification card 
(indicating that she is nineteen) that seems to be forged, Boris believes that she is 
seventeen. 
 
Boris is not guilty of the crime, but he is guilty of attempt.  His M Fact is inculpatory, 
establishing the requisite culpability for attempt, because if the facts were as he believes them 
to be, he would be committing the crime.  Factual “impossibility” is no defense. 
 
3.  Connie 
 
Connie sells a cigarette to Vicky, who is seventeen.  Connie mistakenly believes that 
it is perfectly legal to sell a cigarette to any person over the age of sixteen. 
 
Connie is guilty.  Her mistake about the criminal law (“M Law”) will not be exculpatory 
(absent her reasonable reliance or some other special defense; but no such defense is likely to 
apply). 
 
4.  Daniela 
 
Daniela sells a cigarette to Vicky, who is nineteen.  Daniela mistakenly believes that 
it is illegal (and in violation of the criminal law) to sell a cigarette to any person 
under the age of twenty. 
 
Daniela is not guilty of the crime or of the attempt.  Her M Law will not be inculpatory, even 
though, in a sense, she would be guilty of a crime if the “circumstances” were as she believed 
                                                 
3 A requirement of “knowledge” actually combines a mens rea requirement of belief with an actus reus 
requirement, that the proposition believed is true.  See Simons (1992: 541). 
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them to be—namely, if the jurisdiction made it a crime to sell a cigarette to a person under 
the age of twenty.  “True” or “pure” legal impossibility is a defense.4 
 We can draw an important lesson from these four examples.  In these examples at 
least,5 the criminal law is symmetrical in how it treats mistakes that are relevant to 
exculpation and those that are relevant to inculpation.  Adam’s M Fact exculpates; Boris’s 
inculpates.  Subjective culpability (either its absence or presence) is decisive.  When we turn 
to the M Law made by Connie and Daniela, again the criminal law treats the cases 
symmetrically—but in precisely the opposite way that it treats Adam’s and Boris’s M Fact. 
 Why don’t subjective culpability principles lead us to treat Connie like Adam, and 
Daniela like Boris?  Why don’t we exculpate Connie and inculpate Daniela?  The 
conventional answer: different aspects of the legality principle trumps concerns about the 
absence or presence of culpability.  So Connie is guilty, even if she might seem less culpable 
than an otherwise similar defendant who did not make Connie’s mistake in believing that the 
criminal law does not prohibit sales to persons over sixteen.  Citizens have a duty to know the 
law; ignorance or M Law is ordinarily no excuse.  But Daniela is not guilty of an attempt, 
even if she might seem more culpable than an otherwise similar defendant who did not make 
Daniela’s mistake in believing that the criminal law prohibit sales to persons under twenty.  
Daniela might deserve moral blame, but she has neither done nor attempted anything that the 
criminal law considers blameworthy. 
 
 
II. Overview of normative perspectives 
 
 Is this basic doctrinal approach defensible?  In this paper, I do not attempt to answer 
that question.  Rather, my focus is on a related set of issues: If it is normatively desirable to 
draw a distinction between fact and law in the criminal law, how should we do so?  What 
problems does such a distinction pose?  Which of these difficulties can, and which cannot, be 
overcome? 
 Let us begin with a schematic overview of different possible normative positions on 
the question of when, if ever, ignorance or mistake of criminal law should be a defense.  The 
overview will identify four general positions on the question, “To what extent should M Law 
                                                 
4 See Dressler (2006: 434-436).  Confusingly, many courts employ the term “legal” impossibility for a 
much broader category of cases, many of which involve only M Fact.  See id. 436-437. 
5 The law is not always symmetrical, however, in how it treats the exculpatory and the inculpatory 
implications of a state of mind.  If Adam is simply ignorant (rather than mistaken) about Vicky’s age, this 
might still exculpate him; but it hardly follows that if Boris is ignorant (even unreasonably ignorant) about 
her age, Boris’s unreasonable state of mind inculpates him and permits attempt liability. 
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be a defense, relative to how the law treats M Fact?”  The first position is most favorable to 
criminal defendants, and successive positions are increasing less favorable. 
  
 1.  The equivalence view 
 Under this approach, M Law is treated in precisely the same way as M Fact.  If the 
crime of drug possession requires knowledge of the fact that one is in possession of 
marijuana, it also should require knowledge that marijuana is on the list of controlled 
substances that it is illegal to possess.  If murder requires knowledge that one has in fact 
caused the death of a human being, it also should require knowledge of how the  homicide 
statute defines “human being”; so if Carlos mistakenly believed that killing a fetus inside a 
woman’s womb is not killing a human being (while the law provides that this does count as 
homicide), he would be acquitted of knowing murder.6 
 
 2.  The liberal view 
 Under this approach, ignorance or M Law is always a defense if it is based on 
reasonable grounds.7  But the requisite culpability as to the facts that satisfy the elements of 
an offense is an entirely separate matter: the required culpability might be negligence, and 
thus equivalent to the culpability required as to whether the actor is violating the law, but it 
also might be a higher (or lower) mens rea.  So Carlos can be convicted of murder (defined as 
knowingly causing a person’s death) even if he honestly believed that a fetus is not a human 
being, so long as that belief was negligent or unreasonable. 
 
 3.  The moderate view 
 Under this approach (or family of approaches), M Law is sometimes a defense if it is 
based on reasonable grounds; but once again, a higher (or lower) mens rea might be required 
as to the facts that satisfy the elements of the crime.  By “sometimes” I mean to embrace a 
variety of different approaches.  The Model Penal Code, for example, does not provide a 
general defense of reasonable M Law, but does provide a narrower defense of reasonable 
                                                 
6 Some jurisdictions endorse a partial equivalence approach, applying not to mistake of criminal law but 
only to mistakes of noncriminal law that the criminal law makes relevant.  Under this approach, if a 
defendant is charged with a theft offense, and if even an unreasonable mistaken belief about the facts of 
ownership would be a defense, then even an unreasonable mistake belief about the civil law of property 
ownership would also be a defense.  See Dressler (2006: 186-187). 
7 Some nations endorse this approach, as do many commentators.  For a discussion of Germany’s approach, 
see Schumann (2005: 399-400).  In the United States, New Jersey comes close to endorsing this approach. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 2C, §2-4(c)(3). 
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reliance on official interpretations of the law by judges and administrative officials.8  Some 
commentators, and a few courts, suggest that a defense of reasonable M Law should be 
accepted in the case of malum prohibitum offenses but not in the case of malum in se 
offenses.  And one might endorse a defense of reasonable ignorance of law but not a defense 
of reasonable mistake of law, on the theory that an actor who is aware that the law exists 
should make absolutely certain that he gets its content right. 
 
 4.  The conservative view 
 Under this approach, M Law is never a defense.  Whether the law should require low 
or high levels of culpability as to the facts constituting the offense is treated as a completely 
distinct issue. 
 
 Notice that under all views but the first, we need to distinguish M Fact from M Law 
in at least some cases.  Although the first view does not demand such a distinction, that view 
itself is highly implausible.  Consider two clear implications of this view, each of which is 
very difficult to accept: 
 (1) If we retain the current high culpability requirements for serious offenses (e.g., 
requirements that the actor knowingly or purposely bring about the harm), then we must 
permit even an unreasonable M Law to serve as a defense in a significant number of cases 
(e.g, whenever an offense such as theft or murder permits a defense for an unreasonable M 
Fact). 
 (2)  But if we believe that only a reasonable M Law should provide a defense, the 
approach requires that only a reasonable M Fact will be a defense (thus precluding any mens 
rea requirement greater than negligence).9 
 Moreover, the state often has good reason to impose different mens rea requirements 
(with respect to the factual issues) for different elements of offense.  (Rape statutes require 
that the defendant intended to engage in intercourse, but often only require that he be 
negligent or reckless as to the victim’s nonconsent.)  We then face a problem.  When pegging 
the culpability required with respect to the illegality of the conduct to “the” culpability 
required with respect to the facts, we actually might have two or more options for the latter.  
But how do we choose?  If the accused rapist asserts a credible M Law claim that he did not 
know that nonconsensual oral intercourse is rape, should he be acquitted because he does not 
                                                 
8 Model Penal Code §2.04(3). 
9 For some additional arguments against the equivalence approach along similar lines, see Husak & von 
Hirsch (1993: 157, 160-165). 
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intend to be committing rape, or convicted because he is negligent or reckless as to whether 
rape includes this form of intercourse? 
 Furthermore, when we turn to the analysis of inculpatory mistakes and attempt 
liability, rejecting the M Fact/ M Law distinction is even more implausible.  First, notice that 
whichever of the four positions we take on the exculpatory side, a symmetrical position with 
respect to inculpation hardly follows.  “Liberals,” for example, believe that a reasonable M 
Law always excuses from liability, but it hardly follows that they must endorse the position 
that D’s unreasonable M Law in believing that his conduct is criminal should always result in 
attempt liability.  Second, it is difficult to defend the view that true legal impossibility should 
never be a defense.  Such a view that would permit attempt convictions for purely imaginary 
crimes, and might even require imposition of whatever type and duration of punishment that 
the actor fantasized.  If we wish to reject attempt liability for imaginary crimes yet preserve 
liability for factually impossible attempts, we must sometimes treat M Fact and M Law 
differently. 
 In actual criminal codes, drafters often employ some combination of the four 
approaches mentioned above, requiring equivalence for some elements of some crimes, and 
treating fact and law quite differently in other contexts.  And under any conceivable version 
of a criminal code, I have tried to show, M Fact and M Law must sometimes be 
distinguished, unless we are willing to swallow some very bitter pills. 
 What principles or policies justify this differential treatment?  This is not the 
occasion for a full explication of the question.  But it is worth briefly noting some plausible 
rationales for a distinction.  On the exculpatory side, for some offenses, we have good reason 
to require a high level of culpability (such as knowledge) as to facts but a lower level of 
culpability (such as negligence) as to the criminal law.  Thus, to convict someone of arson, 
with serious penalties, we might wish to require her to know that she started the fire, and 
know that she was likely to seriously damage a building, but we might be content if she was 
merely negligent as to the legal question whether the crime of arson extends to an unoccupied 
as well as an occupied building.  If instead we required only that the actor be negligent as to 
all of these elements, or that she be negligent as to the factual elements but knowing as to all 
of the legal aspects of her conduct, the culpability she would thereby express would be too 
modest to warrant severe punishment.10 
                                                 
10 Or reconsider Adam (who was mistaken about the cigarette buyer’s age and thus believed that she was 
above the legal age of eighteen) and Connie (who was not mistaken about the buyer’s age of seventeen but 
mistakenly believed that the legal age for such sales was sixteen).  It is plausible to require knowledge for a 
M Fact such as Adam’s (thus excusing even for an unreasonable mistakes) but to require at most 
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 On the inculpatory side, an actor who knowingly or purposely takes a risk of 
endangering the interests that (as he correctly recognizes) the state means to protect through 
its criminal law, but who turns out to have selected a factually impossible means, may 
deserve a serious penalty. (Suppose D1 aims at V1 but his gun jams.)  He is certainly more 
deserving of punishment than an actor who knowingly or purposely takes a risk that he 
erroneously believes endangers interests or values that the state means to protect through its 
criminal law.  (Suppose D2 has consensual sex with V2 outside of marriage, mistakenly 
believing that fornication is a crime.)  An actor who believes that the criminal law protects 
interests that it does not, or who believes that it protects interests more stringently than it 
does, might be morally blameworthy for nevertheless flouting “the law” as he sees it, but he 
does not deserve serious punishment.  We can explain this conclusion as flowing either from 
the principle of legality, or from the principle that culpability for purposes of the criminal law 
is only meaningful if it is understood and defined with reference to the type of harms and 
wrongs that the law actually prohibits.11 
 
III. The fundamental distinction between M Fact and M Law 
 
 If under any plausible normative view the criminal law does need to draw a 
distinction between a M Fact and a M Law, how should it do so?  I suggest a general 
approach, drawing on recent accounts by Gerald Leonard and Peter Westen.12  The 
fundamental distinction is between:  
(1) M Law: a mistake about what the state prohibits (including a mistake about how 




(2) M Fact: a mistake about the instantiation of that prohibitory norm in a particular 
case, where the mistake does not flow from the first type of mistake. 
                                                                                                                                                 
negligence for a M Law such as Connie’s (thus excusing only for reasonable mistakes).  Imposing a duty 
on all sellers to assure themselves of the governing legal rules is not very burdensome, but imposing a duty 
on pain of criminal liability to find out the relevant facts about a buyer’s age is more burdensome and 
arguably is unduly harsh unless we require a higher level of culpability as to facts—knowledge or at least 
recklessness. 
11 For an analysis along these lines, see Westen (2008).  For the argument that such an actor deserves 
modest criminal punishment, for attempting to violate (what he took to be) the criminal law, see Fletcher 
(1986: 59); for the contrary argument, see Duff (1996: 156-159). 
12 I concede that this approach might need modest qualification depending on one’s underlying normative 
perspective, and depending on whether the question is the relevance of mistake to exculpation or instead to 
inculpation. 
 The question before us is how to distinguish law from fact for purposes of these exculpatory and 
inculpatory criminal law doctrines.  The law/fact distinction obviously is drawn differently for other legal 
purposes, such as allocating decision-making authority between judges, juries, and administrative agencies. 
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 Thus, I largely agree with the analysis that Peter Westen recently suggested in an 
article on impossibility and attempt liability: 
An actor makes a mistake of law in an impossibility case and, hence, has a defense, if 
he is in need of the services of a good lawyer—that is, if, although he knows what he 
is empirically doing, he mistakenly believes that the state has officially declared acts 
of that type to be punishable.  An actor makes a mistake of fact in an impossibility 
case, and, hence, has no defense, if he is in need of the services of a good private 
investigator—that is, if, although he knows what act-types the state officially declares 
to be punishable, he mistakenly believes that his conduct is an act-token thereof.13 
 
More precisely, Westen elucidates the distinction this way: 
The “law,” for the purposes of the test [distinguishing attempts that are factually 
impossible from attempts that are legally impossible], consists of a full specification 
of the act-types that the state officially declares to be punishable.  The “facts” consist 
of the empirical features that determine whether conduct is an act-token of what is 
acknowledged to be a prohibited act-type.  It follows, therefore, that no middle 
ground exists between law and fact, and there are no “mixed” mistakes that consist of 
neither one nor the other.14 
 
Although Westen is here investigating the distinction in the context of impossibility and 
potentially inculpatory mistakes, his characterization also applies to a possibly exculpatory M 
Fact or M Law that a defendant will try to claim warrants acquittal. 
                                                 
13 Westen (2008: 535). 
14 Westen (2008: 534-535) (citations omitted). 
 In his comment on an earlier draft of this article, Alexander argues that the type/token distinction 
does not illuminate the law/fact distinction.  I agree with him in part.  He is correct that legal categories 
vary in their generality, so that, at least on a plausible understanding of the type/token distinction, what 
Westen and I characterize as a mistake of “law” could be classified as a mistake either of a law-type or of a 
law-token.  See Wetzel (2008).  As Alexander says, the EPA’s designation of polar bears as an endangered 
species is in a sense a token of the legal type, “the EPA's general authority to designate such species” (and, 
I would add, the EPA’s general authority is itself a token of the legal type, “legal authority that Congress 
has delegated,” and so forth). 
 But I still find Westen’s use of the type/token distinction enlightening.  In my view, a M Fact can 
always be understood as a token relative to the type* of conduct prohibited by the criminal law.  That type* 
could, to be sure, be a broad generalization of the kind of conduct that is prohibited (a law-type, e.g. any 
species designated by the EPA), or instead a relatively specific instantiation of such a generalization (and 
thus, perhaps, a law-token, e.g. polar bears, which the EPA has designated as protected).  Still, no matter 
how specific the relevant legal criterion is, it is apt to characterize the questions (a) whether defendant’s 
actual conduct (e.g., shooting a particular bear) instantiates that criterion, and (b) whether defendant is 
correct or incorrect in believing that his conduct is or is not an instantiation, as expressing the relationship 
of token (factual instantiation) to type (legal criterion).  Put differently, a defendant who makes a mistake 
about whether his conduct falls within the legal prohibition, but who fully understands the scope and 
meaning of the prohibition, is making a M Fact, a mistake that in an important sense is a “token” of the 
“type” given by that definition (no matter how specific the definition is). 
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 In one respect this analysis is too simple.  What the law is, and how it has been 
authoritatively interpreted, are indeed questions of fact,15 at least insofar as “fact” is 
contrasted with an actor’s purely subjective perception, opinion, or judgment about the matter 
at hand.  But the important point is that nonlegal “facts” (in this sense) can be reliably 
distinguished from legal “facts.”  As Gerald Leonard explains, a M Law “is a failure to 
recognize and understand the meanings of the statutory terms that govern one’s case.”16  By 
contrast, a M Fact is a mistake “untainted by an incorrect understanding of what 
characteristics or circumstances the court takes to be equivalent in meaning to a statutory 
term.”17  As Leonard’s explanation suggests, we should, when drawing the distinction, begin 
with an account of ignorance or mistake of law, and then treat all other claims that ignorance 
or mistake is relevant to criminal liability as involving ignorance or mistake of (nonlegal) 
fact. 
 Larry Alexander has challenged the fact/law distinction, claiming that because 
application of law is part of its meaning, factual mistakes are ultimate legal ones; and, in the 
context of impossibility, factual impossibility ends up being a species of legal impossibility.18  
But if “legal impossibility” here refers to true legal impossibility of the sort exemplified by 
Daniela, Alexander is incorrect.  “Application of the law” can readily be sorted into cases 
where that mistaken application is based on a mistake of nonlegal fact and cases in which the 
mistaken application is based on misunderstanding of the legal norm.19  To be sure, we need 
to understand the possible applications of legal standards in order to understand their 
meaning; but it hardly follows that a mistake about the facts is just a mistake about the law.  
In the earlier examples, Adam does not know that the person to whom he sold a pack of 
                                                 
15 See Alexander (1993: 37, 57-58) (pointing out that the existence or meaning of a legal norm is a question 
of fact, at least for a legal positivist); Lawson (1992: 862-865). 
16 Leonard (2001: 529).  
17 Id. at 531.  For other accounts of the criminal law distinction between law and fact, see Stuart (2007: 
366-370); Williams (1961: 287-289). 
18 Alexander, (1993: 48-53).  Alexander gives a number of supposed examples of this skeptical thesis, some 
of which I discuss below. 
19 See Westen (2008: 534 n. 32): 
 
Larry Alexander denies that any “nonarbitrary line” exits between law and fact in impossibility 
cases.  …  He argues that, “If [the] application [of a law] is part of [its] meaning—and consider 
whether one ‘knows’ the meaning of a law if he cannot identify any actual extension of it in the 
world—then factual mistakes are legal ones, and factual impossibility is a species of legal 
impossibility.”  [Alexander (1993: 52)]  … I think Alexander confuses “application of law” qua a 
state’s full specification of the act-types it prohibits and “application of the law” qua actual act-
tokens thereof.  Yes, every criminal event is an act-token of an act-type that the state has declared to 
be prohibited.  But mistakes regarding what act-types are prohibited (law) differ from mistakes 
regarding whether conduct is an act-token thereof (fact).  Both mistakes can result in a person 
thinking that he has violated the law when he has not, but the sources of the mistakes differ. 
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cigarettes is seventeen, not nineteen; and Boris does not know that his buyer is nineteen, not 
seventeen.  But the factual mistakes of Adam and Boris do not reflect any confusion on their 
part about the legal meaning of “eighteen” in the relevant law. 
 The basic distinction between law and fact is straightforward and defensible, 
notwithstanding the claim of some skeptics, such as Alexander, that it is incoherent.  But in 
particular contexts, it seems, the distinction either is very difficult to draw, or fails to serve 
the criminal law principles that it ordinarily effectuates.20  Let us take a closer look, then, at 
how the distinction plays out in these more problematical contexts. 
 
IV.   The distinction elaborated 
 
 A.   Difficulties locating the boundary between fact and law 
 
  1.  Mistake as to an evaluative (rather than descriptive) criterion 
 
 Many instances of M Law are straightforward mistakes about an unambiguous, 
specific, rule-like legal criterion.  Recall Connie, who mistakenly believes that it is legal to 
sell a cigarette to any person over the age of sixteen, and Daniela, who mistakenly believes 
that it is illegal to sell a cigarette to any person under the age of twenty.  In this type of crime, 
it is unlikely that anyone would make a legally relevant mistake about what counts as being 
age twenty.  (“Mr. Law” in the introduction makes a similarly straightforward mistake about 
a rule-like criterion.) 
 Many other legal errors are about how complex statutory provisions are to be read 
together.  Others concern the precise definitions of elements of an offense.  And still others 
are about how courts will later interpret an ambiguous provision.  Judicial dockets are replete 
with examples of all of these categories. 
                                                 
20 Doctrinally, an important difficulty is how to treat ignorance or mistake of noncriminal law—where the 
criminal law itself incorporates legal norms from “outside” the criminal law.  In theft law, for example, 
criminal law often incorporates by reference the civil property law definition of “property,” and the 
question arises whether a requirement that the defendant “know that he has taken the property of another” 
requires acquittal if defendant makes a mistake (even an unreasonable mistake) about who owns the 
property in question.  Because the issue is of less interest to criminal law theorists and philosophers, I do 
not address it in this paper. 
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 But one significant category of possible error about the law has received relatively 
little notice in this context21: where the legal element about which the defendant might be 
mistaken is explicitly defined by evaluative criteria, criteria that will be given ultimate 
content only by the trier of fact.  When an evaluative criterion is an actus reus element of an 
offense,22 it can be extraordinarily difficult to distinguish a M Fact from a M Law.  But, as we 
have seen, jurisdictions commonly differentiate the two, usually treating a M Fact more 
leniently than a M Law.  And then it is difficult or impossible to determine whether the trier 
of fact has properly applied that differential approach. 
 Consider four examples. 
 (1) In some jurisdictions, an essential element of criminal liability for a theft offense 
is the defendant’s “dishonesty.”  English law imposes such a requirement, though the statute 
says little about what the element means.  English courts initially gave the element content by 
exculpating any defendant who subjectively believed that what he was doing was honest.23  
But this approach was later rejected in favor of a more objective approach. 
…Robin Hood or those ardent anti-vivisectionists who remove animals from 
vivisection laboratories are acting dishonestly, even though they may consider 
themselves to be morally justified in doing what they do, because they know that 
ordinary people would consider those actions to be dishonest.24 
 
The new test requires proof both that what was done was “dishonest according to the ordinary 
standards of reasonable and honest people,” and that defendant “[realized] that reasonable 
and honest people would regard what he did as dishonest.”25 
 But notice a serious problem that even this new test poses.  The trier of fact still 
retains substantial discretion to define the operative standard, “ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people.”  If a defendant is convicted under this standard despite  his 
claim of mistake, he cannot tell why the jury rejected his claim.  Did they believe he made an 
unconvincing claim of M Fact?  Or did they conclude that he made a convincing, but legally 
irrelevant, claim of M Law? 
                                                 
21 The examples that follow raise a number of problems, including vagueness.  But they are rarely analyzed 
as possible illustrations of M Law.  For an illuminating discussion of the varieties of vagueness, and of the 
distinctive vagueness problems with evaluative criteria, see Endicott (2001: Ch. 3.9, 3.10, & 5.4). 
22 Similarly, when an evaluative criterion is employed as a mens rea or culpability element—for example, 
“negligence” or “extreme indifference to the value of human life”—it is very difficult to specify the content 
of the criterion.  See Simons (2003a).  But the special problem of distinguishing M Fact from M Law does 
not arise here, because the criminal law does not require an actor to possess mens rea as to his own mens 
rea.  However, whether “negligence” is a mens rea or actus reus element is itself disputed.  See note 43 
infra. 
23 Simester & Sullivan (2007: 489-495). 
24 Regina v. Ghosh, [1982] QB 1053. 
25 Id. 
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 Thus, suppose Cynthia is charged with conducting a fraudulent business scheme.  
She believes that “dishonesty" (according to "ordinary standards”) means (1) violating 
customary standards of business behavior.  Another possible meaning is (2) violating ideal 
standards of business behavior, as defined by a consensus of leading experts (or as defined by 
the most ethically rigorous behavior actually found in the marketplace).  Suppose her 
allegedly fraudulent scheme is clearly criminal under (2) but not so clearly criminal under (1), 
because she offers some factual evidence suggesting that she did not actually violate 
customary standards.  Cynthia is then convicted under an instruction simply asking the jury to 
consider whether her conduct was “dishonest according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people.”  Cynthia cannot know the basis of her conviction.  She cannot 
know whether she was convicted because the jury chose standard (2) rather than (1), even 
though it accepted her factual claim that she did not violate standard (1); or instead because, 
although it applied (1), it rejected her factual claim that she did not violate custom. 
 Cynthia’s inability to determine why she was convicted is especially troubling 
because, under most jurisdictions' rules, a M Law is treated much less favorably than a M 
Fact.  So at most Cynthia might obtain a defense of M law if her mistake was reasonable, 
while even an unreasonable M Fact might excuse.  If this were the jurisdiction’s approach 
(i.e., if fraud requires knowledge of the facts but only negligence as to the legal criterion of 
“dishonesty”26), then Cynthia should receive the benefit of an acquittal if the jury was 
persuaded that she made an unreasonable M Fact, but should not receive an acquittal if it was 
persuaded that she made an unreasonable M Law.  Yet there is no way to determine the basis 
of the jury’s decision.  Accordingly, there is a risk—a risk that neither Cynthia’s attorney nor 
the courts can readily correct—that the M Fact and M Law rules will be improperly applied. 
 In short, the policy of permitting the trier of fact discretion to give content to an 
evaluative criterion such as “dishonesty” conflicts with the policies that justify a distinction 
between M Fact and M Law.  Not only is the defendant unable to know precisely what 
conduct is prohibited, but no one can know whether a defendant’s proffered mistake defense 
is properly characterized as a (legally relevant) M Fact or a (quite possibly legally irrelevant) 
M Law.  Perhaps the vagueness problem is soluble—for example, by insisting that a 
reasonably law-abiding person would not be surprised to learn that the type of conduct he 
                                                 
26 Although the English courts have created a two-part test of dishonesty, the second part of which is more 
subjective, this is insufficient to remedy the problem.  That second part requires defendant to have 
subjectively realized that “reasonable and honest people” would regard what he did as dishonest.  But this 
does not resolve the question of how we should specify what he must realize.  Is interpretation (1), or (2), 
or yet some other interpretation, the correct specification? 
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engaged in did violate the statute.  But such a solution does not resolve the second problem, 
of how to classify mistakes as “law” rather than “fact” in this context.27 
 The problem arises for a wide variety of evaluative criteria.  As a second example, 
recall the discussion in the introduction of the defense of lesser evils.  The explicit 
requirement that the actor choose the “lesser evil” inevitably must be stated without detailed 
elaboration, since the criterion needs to be broad enough to apply to any crime. 
 Consider two more illustrations. 
 (3) Defendant is charged with knowingly selling “obscene” materials, a term that 
requires that the materials violate community standards of decency.  Must defendant know 
what those standards are, or is it enough that he knows the relevant facts about those 
materials (facts showing that, as a matter of law, the materials violate community 
standards)?28 
 (4) To be negligent or reckless, as this is understood in many jurisdictions, an actor 
must, among other things, create a “substantial” risk of harm.  But the fact-finder might have 
unreviewable discretion to determine how great a risk counts as “substantial.”  Suppose the 
defendant believes that a 1% risk of harm can never be “substantial,” and also believes that he 
has only created a 1% risk of harm.29  But suppose the jury finds that he did create a 
substantial risk of harm.  Has he made a M Fact? A M Law?  It seems impossible to say.30  
Yet, because most jurisdictions treat a M Law less favorably than a M Fact, this 
characterization could determine whether it is proper to convict him.31 
 To be sure, a defendant can always request an instruction specifying the legal 
standard more precisely.  But in many situations, it is legitimate for the judge to demur, and 
to conclude that the jury should have the discretion to employ a more opaque, evaluative, 
relatively unspecified norm.  In determining what counts as dishonesty in fraud, we might 
want the jury to apply its moral judgment; an alternative approach, specifying by very 
                                                 
27 This is only a problem, of course, insofar as the evaluative criterion is not further specified by the 
jurisdiction’s legal authorities.  If the state supreme court resolves the question whether the first or second 
interpretation is correct, then the difficulty I have identified does not arise. 
28 Canadian courts have given the latter answer.  See Stuart (2007: 369). 
29 Imagine that a passenger railroad switches to a new, cheaper method of storing luggage that increases by 
1% the risk that a piece of luggage will fall and injure a passenger. 
30 The jury might have concluded that he actually created a 5% risk of harm, but might have agreed with 
him that a 1% risk is always legally insufficient.  In that case, he has made a mistake of fact.  Or the jury 
might have instead concluded that (a) he was not factually mistaken about having created a 1% risk of 
harm, yet (b) he was legally incorrect in believing that a risk greater than 1% is always necessary for 
criminal liability. 
31 Another set of examples come from international criminal law.  See Eser (2002: 921-925, 936-937) 
(discussing, inter alia, war crimes by “inhumane” treatment and environmental damage “excessive” in 
relation to military advantage). 
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explicit, narrow criteria those practices that are illegal, will inevitably be incomplete and 
might encourage more creative frauds that are not on the official “list.”32  It might be 
desirable for juries, or at least judges, to balance lesser evils case by case without having to 
provide a full specification of the criteria for lesser evils.  And perhaps we want "substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" in negligence to be evaluated according to the moral sense of the 
jury.33 
 These difficulties posed by evaluative criteria can arise, not just with exculpatory 
mistakes, but with inculpatory mistakes as well.  If the defendant believes that he has 
committed forgery but does not realize that he has altered a legally immaterial part of the 
check, what kind of mistake has he made?  In the well-known case Wilson v. State, the 
defendant changed the figure "$2.50" to "$12.50," but did not change the written words "two 
and 50/100."34  Although he believed that he was committing forgery when he changed the 
numbers, he was legally mistaken, for forgery requires a material alteration that could cause 
injury, and a “material” alteration in turn requires that the forger change the words on an 
instrument.  Is defendant guilty of attempted forgery if he believes that changing numbers but 
not words counts as a “material” alteration?  No; this is a mistake as to the scope of the 
criminal law of forgery, as that law has been authoritatively specified.  True legal 
impossibility here precludes attempt liability.  But notice that a subtly different mistake 
would permit attempt liability.  Suppose “material alteration” is defined by a less precise, 
evaluative criterion: “an alteration that would cause a significant proportion of ordinary 
persons who view the check to believe that the altered terms of the check are the actual 
terms.”  Then the defendant could either make a M Fact or a M Law in believing that he has 
committed forgery, corresponding to the mistakes made by corporate executive Cynthia, 
above.  And again, there is no way to know which type of mistake the defendant made.  In 
this inculpatory context, of course, if the defendant makes a M Fact, he can be convicted (for 
an attempt), while if he makes a M Law, he cannot be convicted. 
                                                 
32 See Buell (2006: 1987-1996). 
33 Another possible solution is to instruct the jury conditionally, taking into account the jurisdiction’s 
differential legal treatment of M Fact and M Law.  For example: “If you find that the defendant made a 
mistake of fact, you must find for the defendant, whether or not the mistake was reasonable; but if you find 
that the defendant made a mistake of law, you should ignore that mistake.”  [Or, in place of the last clause: 
“you must find for the defendant if you conclude that his mistake of law was reasonable”].  But this 
solution does not seem realistic. 
34 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905).  Wilson is discussed in Alexander (1993: 46), and Simons (1990: 466-
467).  See also People v. Teal, 89 N. E. 1086, 196 N.Y. 372 (1909) (where D tried to suborn false 
testimony, but the testimony concerned a matter that was legally immaterial to the proceedings), discussed 
in Alexander (1993: 46); Duff (1996: 96-98); and Simons (1990: 467-468). 
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 In conclusion, there is an irreconcilable tension between (1) the policies and 
principles that jurisdictions endorse when they require M Fact to be treated differently from 
M Law, and (2) the policies that both empower a trier of fact to give substantive content to an 
indeterminate, evaluative legal criterion such as “dishonesty,” and at the same time permit the 
trier not to precisely specify that content.  Perhaps granting that discretion to define 
evaluative criteria is a sufficiently important policy that it trumps the policies behind 
differential treatment of M Fact and M Law.  However, I strongly suspect that lawmakers 
who establish evaluative criteria for criminal liability have barely noticed this problem. 
 
  2.  Is every unreasonable M Fact really a M Law? 
 
In a strikingly original argument, Gerald Leonard reaches a radical conclusion: 
whenever an actor has made an unreasonable M Fact, he has really made a M Law.  More 
precisely: “Whenever the law requires a person to make the inferences that a reasonable 
person would have made in the situation, … any mistake resulting from a failure to draw 
those inferences is [a M Law].”35  Leonard’s argument is quite intriguing: a reasonableness 
requirement (even as to what would conventionally be described as a M Fact) simply 
expresses the law’s judgment of what inferences an actor is legally obligated to make in the 
relevant context.  If the law (through the fact finder) says that a reasonable person would, in 
the actor’s circumstances, realize (a) that he was creating an unjustifiable risk of death, or (b) 
that the rape victim was not consenting, or (c) that the actor was not really facing a threat of 
deadly force when he used defensive force, then the actor’s mistaken belief otherwise is, in 
each case, “unreasonable” because of a failure to draw an inference that the law requires. 
This claim, if true, would mean that all reasonableness criteria in the criminal law 
(including both criteria of offense elements, such as unreasonable risk manslaughter 
standards or requirements hat mistake as to nonconsent in rape in self-defense, and also 
criteria for defenses, such as reasonable belief requirements in self-defense) are really just 
requirements that the defendant understand “the law.”  And any unreasonable M Fact about 
whether one has satisfied an offense element, or whether the legal criteria for a defense have 
been satisfied, would be a M Law.  The practical upshot of this argument is a bit unclear, for 
Leonard does insist that a reasonable M Fact is not a M Law.36  Leonard is thus able to avoid 
the disturbing implication that if a jurisdiction retains the venerable “ignorance or mistake of 
law is no excuse” strict liability approach, then strict liability (rather than negligence or 
                                                 
35 Leonard (2001: 564). 
36 Id. at 569. 
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recklessness) is also the presumptively appropriate standard of criminal liability for (what are 
conventionally called) mistakes of fact.  Still, his argument has provocative and unsettling 
implications.  First, instances of M Law are far more prevalent than we had thought.  Second, 
widespread academic objections that M Law often unfairly imposes strict liability are 
overstated, insofar as this (unreasonable M Fact) category of M Law clearly does demand that 
the actor be unreasonable.  And third, the very fact that this category of M Law is 
unproblematic suggests that other, more conventional categories of M Law are less 
problematic than usually believed; for these other categories also can be understood to 
demand only what “unreasonable M Fact” categories demand—that the actor interpret legal 
meaning in the way that the law requires.37 
 Let us take a closer look at Leonard’s argument, focusing (as he does) on the famous 
case of Regina v. Morgan.38  The law, almost all would agree, properly views as 
unreasonable the defendants’ beliefs in that case that the female victim was consenting, since 
their beliefs were based only on her husband’s assurances that she was consenting 
notwithstanding her clear protests and violent struggle when three of them had intercourse 
with her.  Leonard reads the case essentially as involving a mistaken belief by the defendants 
about the meaning of consent: the defendants thought that consent could exist under such 
circumstances, when the law declares otherwise.39  Leonard points out that, although the 
House of Lords concluded that (a) an unreasonable but honest mistake of fact about 
nonconsent does (and in a different case would) preclude punishment for rape, it also 
determined, based on the egregious facts, that (b) no reasonable jury could have believed that 
the defendants in the actual case were honestly mistaken about nonconsent.  But Leonard 
characterizes the second determination, like the first, as a judgment that the defendant has 
actually made a M Law!  In his view, when the court finds insufficient evidence for a jury to 
conclude that defendant could have genuinely subjectively believed that the victim was 
consenting, it is really pointing out that the defendant could only hold such a belief if he 
misunderstood what “consent” means. 
 I find the argument illuminating, but in the end unpersuasive.  Leonard treats as 
analytically identical the following two kinds of honest mistakes: (1) an unreasonable mistake 
about how “consent” is legally defined (the “legal criterion” of consent), and (2) an 
unreasonable mistake, given the facts available to the actor, about whether the victim 
“consented” in the sense required by that legal criterion.  Leonard is correct that on the facts 
                                                 
37 See id. at 573-575. 
38 [1976] A.C. 182 (House of Lords). 
39 Leonard (2001: 569-572). 
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of Morgan, it is difficult to imagine how an actor could satisfy (2), so if the defendants in 
Morgan were honestly mistaken, they were mistaken in sense (1).  Indeed, it is highly 
doubtful that the actors were actually mistaken in either sense.  But the more general and 
more important point is that the two inquiries are conceptually distinct, and this distinction 
makes a practical difference in many other cases that do not present as extreme a set of facts 
as Morgan.  Many instances of (2) do not involve the actor’s misunderstanding of the law in 
sense (1).  Should such cases really be treated like conventional instances of M Law (i.e., 
instances of (1))? 
Consider a more straightforward example that illustrates the distinction, an example 
outside the context of forcible rape40—the crime of distributing tobacco to a person under age 
18 that we examined earlier.  Recall Connie, who distributed tobacco to 17-year old Vicky, 
and who was mistaken about the minimum legal age, believing it to be 16.  This would be a 
classic M Law in sense (1).  Now compare Andrew, who recognizes that the legal age is 18 
and thus is correct about the law in sense (1), but who makes a “M Law” (in Leonard’s sense 
(2)): he mistakenly concludes that Vicky is 19, and that mistake is unreasonable.  (He is very 
gullible and lacks experience determining the age of teenagers.)  The kind of “legal” 
determination (if it is that) entailed in finding that Andrew’s mistake was unreasonable is 
quite different from the kind of legal determination expressed in a statute establishing the 
legal age for distributing tobacco to another. 
When Leonard says that an unreasonable M Fact is a case in which the defendant is 
making a “mistake about the meaning of the legal term” or is “misusing the statutory 
language,” given his experience, the rhetoric conflates these two different types of legal 
mistakes, even if, judged by Leonard’s very broad “M Law” definition, they are indeed both 
instances of M Law.  And the rhetoric is a bit misleading.  Leonard would presumably say 
that Andrew’s unreasonable mistake represents a “mistake about the meaning of ‘under age 
18’ given the facts available to him.”  This seems forced.  The legal meaning of “under age 
18” is not a matter of serious uncertainty.  On a more natural characterization, the example is 
analyzed this way: 
(a) The defendant makes a M Fact about whether this legal element is satisfied in his 
individual case, and  
(b) The fact finder makes a subsequent judgment that that mistake was unreasonable.   
                                                 
40 In that context, defendants not infrequently do make honest but unreasonable mistakes about the law in 
the conventional sense (sense (1)); for example, some defendants might believe that a woman legally 
consents to intercourse unless she resists to the utmost or to some significant extent, or that “no” means 
“yes” unless the woman clearly and repeatedly expresses her unwillingness. 
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Even if the latter judgment is properly described as a judgment about “the law” (insofar as it 
is a normative judgment that the individual fact finder has the authority to make), this type of 
judgment is very different from a more straightforwardly “legal” mistake about whether 16 or 
18 is the minimum legal age for the prohibition on distributing tobacco to a minor.  It is not at 
all clear that the criminal law should treat both types of judgment the same. 
At the same time, Leonard’s argument, though ultimately unpersuasive, is instructive 
in two important ways.  First, he is correct that we often do not focus on the precise legal 
meaning of a criminal law term until we need to apply it to a concrete fact pattern; as a result, 
in practice, we sometimes conflate M Law and M Fact.41  (The meaning of “consent” in rape 
law is a good example.)  As Leonard points out, a defendant cannot unilaterally determine 
that his mistake is one of fact rather than law.  “A defendant cannot claim [M Fact] just by 
distorting the meaning of words; he cannot get a [M Fact] defense by asserting a belief that 
resistance means consent any more than by asserting a belief that red [in the traffic laws] 
means green.”42  Courts and fact finders indeed have an obligation to parse any claim of 
mistake and determine on their own whether the type of mistake the defendant made was one 
of law or one of fact. 
Second, there is merit to Leonard’s point that when a fact finder finds an actor’s 
mistake “unreasonable,” the fact finder is making an explicitly evaluative judgment, a 
judgment that is in this respect similar to the judgment it must make when applying statutes 
employing explicit evaluative criteria of the sort that we discussed in the previous section—
such as “dishonesty” in fraud, choice of “lesser evils” in the necessity defense, or creation of 
a “substantial” risk in negligence and recklessness doctrine. 
Nevertheless, these two types of evaluative judgment also differ in a significant way. 
The determination that the actor made an unreasonable M Fact is a second-order evaluative 
judgment, which supervenes on a factual belief that the statutory standard makes relevant.  
By contrast, when the statutory standard itself requires an evaluative judgment, that is a first-
order determination.  When we explored the complexities and ambiguities of such evaluative 
criteria earlier, we could easily distinguish the criterion itself from the mens rea the actor 
possessed with respect to the criterion.  (We could ask whether “dishonesty” means 
“violating customary business standards,” and then we could separately ask whether Cynthia 
knew what the legal test was, and also whether she knew facts that, as a matter of law, 
                                                 
41 As Leonard puts it: “Legal meaning seems to lie in concrete applications, and any materially 
unreasonable evaluation of a scenario must be a failure to understand legal meaning and thus a mistake of 
law.”  Leonard (2001: 592).  As I have explained, there is merit to the first proposition, but it does not 
entail the second. 
42 Id. at 574. 
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satisfied the legal test.)  But when we conclude that gullible Andrew is “unreasonable” in 
concluding that in fact Vicky is 19, this evaluative judgment cannot easily be separated into 
two analogous parts.  More to the point, it should not be so separated.  Even if we 
characterize Andrew’s incorrect, unreasonable conclusion that Vicky is 19 as, in a loose 
sense, an “interpretation of law,” the criminal law does not, and should not, take an interest in 
Andrew’s mens rea as to that interpretation.  In other words, we do not ask, “Did Andrew 
know that the law would consider unreasonable his conclusion, on this set of facts, that Vicky 
was 19?”  We do not, and should not, require an actor to possess a culpable mens rea with 
respect to his own mens rea.43 
In conclusion, Leonard’s argument, if valid, would radically expand the scope of M 
Law, and would cast doubt on the significance of the distinction between M Fact and M Law.  
But he has not offered sufficient grounds for such a dramatic conclusion. 
 
  3.  Three borderline cases, including Mr. Fact/Mr. Law 
 
 Three different “borderline” objections to the fact/law distinction deserve attention: 
Mr. Fact/Mr. Law; factual mistake engendering mistake about the content or scope of the 
criminal law; and criminal laws that designate a particular object or person.  Each objection 
questions the coherence of the distinction.  Each objection can be answered. 
 
   a.  Mr. Fact/Mr. Law 
 
 The Mr. Fact/Mr. Law bow-hunting example, set forth in the introduction, is often 
offered as a reductio ad absurdum of the fact/ law distinction.  The modern legal approach to 
                                                 
43 Leonard does not endorse such a requirement, but it seems to be an implication of his argument. 
 When Leonard asserts that an actor’s mistake about whether a gun is loaded is in effect a legal 
mistake about what counts as unjustifiable conduct, id. at 580-581, he is treating the actor as analogous to 
Cynthia, when the actor is arguably more analogous to Andrew.  However, there is a genuine dispute about 
whether to treat the “unjustifiable risk” criterion for manslaughter as providing (1) a short-hand legal 
criterion of permissible conduct, or instead (2) a mens rea (or mens rea-like) requirement for the causal 
result, death.   If the first interpretation is correct, then it would be more plausible to also require mens rea 
as to that criterion (for example, to require that the actor know that his conduct is, or might be, 
unjustifiable, or to require that he should have known this).  All risk-creation offenses are ambiguous in this 
way. 
 What is the Model Penal Code’s view of these matters?  My understanding is that the fact finder is 
to determine as a matter of law what counts as an “unjustifiable risk,” and that the Code’s definition of 
recklessness (which requires some form of subjective awareness) does not require awareness or belief that 
one’s conduct is unjustifiable, though it does require awareness (a) that one’s conduct poses a substantial 
risk of harm and (b) of the facts that make one’s conduct unjustifiable.  Simons (2003b: 189).  But this 
account of recklessness reveals that it is a bit of a mixture of interpretations (1) and (2). 
Page 23 of 35 Nov. 17, 2008 Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact 
impossibility would provide that Mr. Fact is guilty of an attempt but Mr. Law is not.  Because 
they reject factual impossibility as a defense, the “moderns” would convict Mr. Fact.  
Because they continue to endorse “true” legal impossibility as a defense, they would acquit 
Mr. Law.  Yet Mr. Fact and Mr. Law appear to differ not a whit in their dangerousness or 
culpability.  Can we really justify treating them differently? 
 Yes we can.44  On closer examination, this famous example does not reveal the 
absurdity of the fact/law distinction.  Rather, it demonstrates that in the rare instance of a 
criminal statute whose legal categories are perfectly arbitrary, or nearly so, inculpatory M 
Law is indeed normatively indistinguishable from inculpatory M Fact.  For pragmatic 
reasons, however, it makes sense to apply a uniform rule that no inculpatory M Law, not even 
this rare type, should result in attempt liability.  Let me explain. 
 One important feature of the example is the sheer arbitrariness of the dates when 
hunting is prohibited.  Mr. Law is fully aware that a legal rule (prohibiting hunting out of 
season) covers his conduct, and his only mistake is with respect to a largely arbitrary line-
drawing feature of the law.  No one seriously thinks it matters whether the entire hunting 
season is shifted a week earlier or a week later.  By contrast, most criminal laws contain 
categories that bear a nonarbitrary relationship to the relevant harm or wrong that the state is 
concerned to prevent or denounce.  (Obvious examples include gradations of theft depending 
on the amount knowingly stolen, or gradations of assault and homicide depending on the 
degree or type of harm intentionally caused.)  And even in the examples we have been 
considering, of Adam, Boris, Connie, and Daniela and the law against selling cigarettes to 
persons under age eighteen, the line-drawing is not so deeply arbitrary.  Younger people are 
generally less mature, so it is sensible to draw age-specific lines in prohibiting various types 
of dangerous activities, even though the specific age chosen (18 years vs. 17 years, 10 
months) is arbitrary.  By contrast, establishing the specific dates when hunting may take place 
is presumably designed (a) to solve a coordination problem (other citizens have a right to 
know when it is safe to walk in the woods without having to wear orange or bright clothing) 
and (b) to manage and limit the total number of prey that are killed that season.  One could 
serve these purposes by selecting any hunting period of equivalent duration, any time of the 
year.45 
                                                 
44 I confess to being a supporter of Barack Obama. 
45 Consider another example—“Ms. Tax Law”—an example even more extreme than Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law 
because it involves a perfectly arbitrary law.  Suppose that in even-numbered years, individual tax forms 
must be filed by April 15 if your name ends in A-L, and by May 1 if your name ends in M-Z.  In odd-
numbered years, the converse.  The point is to spread out IRS workload.  Here, it seems justifiable to 
punish “Ms. Tax Law” for an attempt, if she files on May 1, 2008 but incorrectly believes she was 
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 Why does this matter?  In many “true” legal impossibility examples, e.g. when 
someone erroneously believes that fornication is a crime, or that public criticism of the 
government is a crime, or that a repealed criminal statute is still in effect, the defendant’s 
view of the interests and values currently protected by the criminal law is seriously at odds 
with the legislature’s.  That he or she is willing to violate the criminal law is troublesome, to 
be sure, but serious criminal punishment for acting on that disposition is unacceptable.  Even 
in the sale-to-minors example, where the age limit is to some extent arbitrary, the legislature 
has a less arbitrary reason for establishing the age distinction than in the Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law 
example.  Recall Daniela, who believed that the law punishes the sale of cigarettes to those 
under twenty, when actually it prohibits sales only to those under eighteen.  It would be at 
least somewhat troubling to punish Daniela for having a different view of the governing 
values in the jurisdiction than the jurisdiction actually intends to effectuate, i.e., for believing 
that the criminal law is more protective of younger persons than it actually is.  By contrast, 
Mr. Fact and Mr. Law seem equally willing to violate the law and to defy the values that the 
law represents (the values of social coordination and protection of wildlife).  Mr. Law’s 
mistake about the actual dates of the hunting season hardly reflects a benighted belief that the 
criminal law is more protective or more rigorous in protecting animals from hunting, or in 
preserving quiet, than it turns out to be.  Rather, the criminal law turns out to be arbitrarily 
different in its scope than he expected it to be.  In such a case, the policy arguments against 
punishing for legally impossible attempts are considerably weaker.46 
 Still, the distinction between fact and law is a sharp one.  And there are good 
pragmatic and prudential reasons for relying on this distinction in defining the scope of 
attempt liability.  The “law” side of the distinction correlates very well (though not perfectly, 
given borderline cases like Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law) with the policy against punishing actors who 
                                                                                                                                                 
supposed to file by April 15.  (At least, this seems as justifiable as punishing Ms. Tax Fact who files on 
May 1 but believes the date is May 5.)  To be sure, Ms. Tax Law has made a M Law.  But this is not a case 
where she has a view of the values protected by the criminal law that differs in any way from the 
legislature’s view. 
 The original Mr. Fact/Mr. Law example is less arbitrary, however, if the actual dates are relevant 
to a social harm—for example, if the no-hunting period is chosen in part because that is when animals give 
birth.  (I thank Stan Fisher for this observation.) 
46A similar argument can be offered on the exculpatory side.  Here, too, the fact/law distinction has much 
less force if the legal classification is quite arbitrary.  Suppose Mr. Fact2 makes an exculpatory factual 
mistake about what day it is: if his belief were true, he would not have been hunting illegally.  Now 
suppose Mr. Law2 makes a legal mistake about the dates when hunting is permitted: if his belief were true, 
he would not have been hunting illegally.  Should Mr. Law2’s belief also exculpate?  If the dates of the 
hunting season are arbitrary, I incline to answer yes, even though, in the analogous cases of Adam and 
Connie, it is defensible to exculpate Adam (who made a factual mistake) more readily than Connie (who 
made a legal mistake), e.g., to excuse Adam even for an unreasonable mistake but to excuse Connie only 
for a reasonable mistake. 
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believe that the criminal law is more rigorous than it turns out to be.  It would be very 
difficult to identify reliably the small category of cases (such as Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law) in which 
the actor’s view of the values protected by the criminal law is no different at all from the 
legislature’s.  And, if one is skeptical about the justice or efficacy of attempt liability in 
general, one would demand a more compelling reason for extending the scope of liability for 
this category of impossible attempts. 
 To conclude, in the “Mr. Fact/Mr. Law” example, it is quite easy to distinguish the 
relevant M Fact from the relevant M Law.  While the example initially seems to raise a 
serious question about whether that distinction should ever be employed to identify which 
mistakes should result in attempt liability, on closer analysis the example is simply the rare 
exception that proves (the rationale for) the rule. 
 
   b.  M Fact engenders mistake about the content or scope of the law 
 
 The second borderline objection is that a factual misperception or mistake can lead to 
an error about the content or scope of the law.  In such a case, it seems, the fact/law 
distinction breaks down.  Alexander gives several examples, including the following: 
 (1) A woman knowingly imports French lace, but she misreads the word “Flemish” 
as “French” on the list of dutiable items, and thus erroneously believes that French lace must 
be declared.  She does not declare the lace. 
 (2) A man knows that the state forbids hunting on days when a red flag is displayed 
at the Fish and Game Department office but permits hunting on days when a green flag is 
displayed.  He is colorblind, and misperceives the green sign as red.  He nevertheless hunts.47 
 In each case, the actor’s factual misperception leads to their erroneous belief that 
what they are doing is a crime.  In a sense, then, each is a factual impossibility case, so one 
might think that each actor should be guilty of an attempt.  But this conclusion is 
unwarranted.  The M Fact in these cases is unusual: it is not about the nature of the actor’s 
primary conduct or about any other actus reus element of the crime (as in the usual M Fact 
case, such as believing that the recipient of a cigarette is younger than she actually is, or 
believing that the victim at which one is shooting is still alive).  Rather, the M Fact concerns 
only the scope or meaning of the criminal prohibition; it concerns what actus reus elements 
the criminal law actually does require.  We should therefore treat each case, for legal 
                                                 
47 Alexander (1993: 49-50). 
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purposes, as a M Law, not a M Fact (and thus we should not permit conviction for attempt).48  
And in the converse scenarios, where the actor misreads the word “French” as “Flemish” or 
misperceives a red flag as green, and the actor claims that his mistake is a M Fact that should 
excuse, we should reject this characterization and apply whatever rule we would otherwise 
apply to a M Law. 
 To be sure, one might understandably conclude otherwise: facts are facts, and factual 
misperceptions as a class arguably should be treated differently than misunderstandings of the 
law untainted by factual misperceptions.  (In terms of Westen’s useful suggestion for 
distinguishing M Fact from M Law, quoted at the outset, in these unusual M Law cases, the 
actor needs a good private investigator as much as she needs a good lawyer!)  Still, treating 
every factual misperception that results in a misunderstanding of the content or scope of the 
                                                 
48 Westen agrees with me that the first example should be treated as a M Law.  As he explains: 
 
[The woman] is making a mistake of law, because while she knows the empirical features that her 
conduct actually possesses, she does not know that the state has declared conduct with such 
features [not] to be a prohibited act-type. 
 
Westen (2008: 535 n. 34).  (I have added “[not]” to the passage because this is clearly Westen’s meaning, 
and he has confirmed this interpretation by email.  Email from P. Westen to K. Simons, dated May 8, 
2008.)) 
 Surprisingly, however, Westen treats the second example as a M Fact, for the following reason: 
 
[A]n actor who knows that the state declares hunting on days with a red flag to be an act-type of 
poaching, but who, being colorblind, sees a red flag where there is actually a green flag, makes a 
mistake of fact because, while he knows what act-types are prohibited, he mistakenly thinks that 
his conduct possesses one of the empirical features that, if present, constitutes what he knows is 
the act-type. 
 
 I disagree with Westen’s treatment of the red flag case in this article.  In both this case and the 
Flemish/French case, the actor does not make a mistake about her primary conduct or about any actus reus 
element; rather, their mistake (albeit factual) is about the scope of the law.  In the red flag case, to be sure, 
the scope of the law is publicized to the public in an unusual way.  But this is no different than, say, a 
Roman consul announcing the terms of a relevant law orally, and a citizen mishearing the words he spoke, 
or a conscientious citizen of Massachusetts today intending to peruse a volume of the Massachusetts 
General Laws and mistakenly grabbing the Maryland Laws volume instead.  None of these cases should 
count as M Fact. (In a recent email communication, Westen agrees with me that he should have classified 
the red flag case as a M Law, not a M Fact. (Email from P. Westen to K. Simons, dated May 16, 2008.)) 
 To be sure, some difficult borderline cases remain.  Alexander gives the example of Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den, Inc, 495 U.S. 116 (1982), in which churches were in effect authorized to prohibit bars from 
locating within a particular distance of the church.  “Suppose an establishment owner believes erroneously 
that a church next door has objected to his opening a bar, but he does so anyway.  Has he made a mistake of 
law (it’s illegal to open a bar next to the church) or only of extension [of the law, and thus, a M Fact]?” 
Alexander (2002: 839).  This is a borderline case because we do not ordinary treat entities such as churches 
as authorized to declare the content of the law; their ability to restrict the defendant’s property rights (on 
pain of his criminal liability) seems to express their private rights, and thus seems analogous to a person’s 
ability to withhold consent to a physical touching, and therefore within the province of M Fact, not M Law.  
By contrast, when a government official has the authority to declare today a hunting day by raising a green 
flag, a mistake about what color flag he has raised is more straightforwardly a mistake about the scope of 
the criminal law. 
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criminal law as a M Fact would be problematic.  Insofar as a jurisdiction has plausible 
reasons for generally treating a M Law less favorably than a M Fact (e.g., requiring only the 
former mistakes to be reasonable), it is not at all clear that those reasons warrant special 
favorable treatment of the unusual cases we are considering.  Alternatively, if the better view 
is that the jurisdiction should more liberally excuse for a M Law, this new principle should be 
adopted categorically, and not arbitrarily limited to these unusual cases in which a M Fact 
fortuitously is a partial explanation for a genuine M Law. 
 
   c.  Laws that designate a particular object or person 
 
 The third and last “borderline” objection concerns laws that pick out a particular 
object or have a unique designation.  And the term “borderline” is especially apt here, 
because one illustration of this category is a mistake about a legal boundary.  Cases in this 
category are indeed sometimes difficult to sort into M Fact or M Law, though in principle, the 
distinction remains viable here. 
 It is tempting, Leonard points out, to think that a mistake about “law” must be about 
a general criterion or category, such as how “property” is defined or whether the age of 
consent is eighteen or twenty-one.  But actually, a “legal” criterion can refer to a unique 
object, entity, or person.49  Thus, if it is a federal crime to assassinate “the President,” then the 
defendant could make either a relevant factual or a relevant legal mistake.  In killing the 
person behind the curtain, defendant could have unknowingly killed a Secret Service Agent 
rather than (as he believed and intended) the current President George W. Bush.  Or 
defendant could have knowingly killed Martin Sheen, who played fictional President Josiah 
Bartlet on the TV show West Wing, irrationally believing that because he plays the President 
on a television show, Sheen is actually the current duly-elected President.  Both of these are 
mistakes of fact.50  By contrast, in killing former President George H. W. Bush, defendant 
might believe that he is killing a “President” and thus committing an assassination, but he 
would be legally incorrect: the law does not provide the same high penalty for killing a 
former President.51  In these types of cases, the general principles relating to inculpatory and 
                                                 
49 See Leonard (2001: 527 n. 76, & 535). 
50 More precisely: if the defendant, fascinated with reality shows, believes that the TV show West Wing is a 
reality show starring the person whom the people actually elected President, his mistake about Sheen’s 
status would be a M Fact; but if defendant thinks that anyone who plays the President on TV thereby 
becomes the President under the Constitution, this mistake would be a M Law.  (Thanks to Peter Westen 
for this clarification.) 
51 At the same time, if a defendant believed that in killing President-elect George W. Bush in 2000 he was 
not committing an assassination, he would again be legally incorrect.  The federal crime of assassination 
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exculpatory mistakes—principles that might sometimes justify differential treatment of M 
Fact and M Law—apply with just as much force as in cases where the criminal law extends to 
a broader category of persons or acts. 
 But now consider an example (from Paul Robinson52) of a mistake relating to a legal 
boundary, which I elaborate as follows.  D does not know whether his liquor store is within 
Dry Town (where it is illegal to sell liquor) or Wet Town (where it is legal).  Has he made a 
M Fact or M Law?   To answer, we need to know more.  As Leonard points out, if defendant 
knows that his store is on the north side of Elm Street, and “[i]f being on the north side of 
Elm Street necessarily places one within the boundaries of the dry town under the statute, 
then any failure to draw that inference is a [M Law].”53  But if defendant is confused about 
the location of his store and believes it to be on the south side of Elm Street when it is 
actually on the north side, he has made a M Fact. 
In such a boundary mistake case, as in the Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law example, the policy 
reasons that normally support the fact/law distinction are much less compelling.  In an 
attempt case, for example, if Mr. Fact# believes that his property is on the north side of Elm 
Street when it is not, while Mr. Law# is correct that his property is on the south side but 
incorrectly believes that the law forbids selling liquor on the south side, both actors defy the 
values underlying the prohibition on liquor sales to the same extent.  As is the case with the 
dates of hunting season in Mr. Fact/ Mr. Law, here the precise location of the legal boundary 
between Dry Town and Wet Town is probably arbitrary.  Pragmatic objections (such as 
difficult of proof) aside, it would be justifiable to punish both actors for attempt.  And it 
would similarly be justifiable to acquit both Mr.Fact* and Mr. Law* if the two actors made 
exculpatory mistakes analogous to those of Mr. Fact# and Mr. Law#.54 
 
 B.   Converting M Fact into M Law 
 
 M Fact and M Law interact in a number of ways.  We have already discussed one 
aspect of this interaction: in unusual circumstances, a M Fact can engender a M Law.55  I now 
                                                                                                                                                 
applies to the current inhabitant of the Office and to the President-elect, but not to former Presidents.  18 
U.S.C. §1751(a). 
52 Robinson (1984: 380 & n. 26).  See also Leonard (2001: 519, 527, 536). 
53 Leonard (2001: 536). 
54 See note 46 supra. 
55 See section IV.A.3b, above.  Another, little-noticed aspect of the interaction is where ignorance of law 
engenders ignorance or mistake of fact.  If I do not know that the law requires me, an ex-felon, to register 
after residing in a city for five days, cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), then perhaps I also will 
not “know” all the facts that make my conduct illegal.  Do I “know” that I have resided in the city for five 
Page 29 of 35 Nov. 17, 2008 Simons, Mistake of Law and Fact 
turn to a more common phenomenon: specification or evolution of a criminal law norm can 
convert a M Fact into a M Law. 
 Criminal law norms change.  Two forms of change are especially relevant to the 
relationship between M Fact and M Law—later specification of a more general, opaque 
norm; and the evolution of a norm in a way that dramatically limits the types of M Fact that 
continue to excuse.  In both cases, defendants who in the past might have succeeded with a 
claim of exculpatory M Fact now might be precluded because their mistake has become a M 
Law. 
 First, consider specification.  Suppose that a jurisdiction employs only this general, 
opaque criterion for self-defense: “Actors may use only proportionate and necessary force in 
self-defense, and ‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’ shall be determined case by case by the 
jury.”   The jurisdiction then modifies the criterion by endorsing the detailed rules of the 
Model Penal Code about proportionality (including the rules about when deadly v. nondeadly 
force may be used) and necessity (including the rules about retreat).  Once the new criterion 
is specified, it becomes much clearer whether an actor has made a M Fact or a M Law.  
Under the old criterion, this is almost impossible to determine.  Defendants are likely to fare 
much worse under the newer provisions, since defendants now are vulnerable to the 
government’s objection that their mistake (for example, a mistake about whether it was 
“proportionate” to use force to shoot an escaping rapist) is one of law and thus does not 
excuse.  There is nothing objectionable about such a legal change.  After all, the very point of 
the change is to establish a new and more demanding set of legal requirements. 
 At the same time, further specification might sometimes produce resulting 
distinctions between M Fact and M Law that seem morally arbitrary.  Consider again the law 
of self-defense.  Under the imperfect self-defense doctrine, many states reduce the grade of 
homicide when a person makes an honest mistake about facts such as the severity of the force 
threatened, even if that mistake is unreasonable.  But, as Gerry Leonard points out, this 
doctrine has a troubling implication: a defendant who kills an attempted robber is better off 
arguing that he honestly thought that the victim was trying to kill him, even if his belief is 
quite unreasonable, than arguing that he honestly (but mistakenly) thought that deadly force 
is a legally proportionate response to a robbery (even if the robber does not threaten deadly 
                                                                                                                                                 
days?  Do I “know” that I have not registered if I don’t realize I have a duty to do so?  Perhaps I have given 
these matters no thought.  But if the statute in question requires knowledge of all these facts, then even if 
the jurisdiction endorses the maxim, “ignorance of law does not excuse,” it might turn out that ignorance of 
the law frequently excuses defendants because that ignorance results in their failing to know the legally 
relevant facts!  When this is so, ignorance of the law turns out to be an excuse, after all.  See Simons 
(2003b: 194). 
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force).56  Under the older and less specific norm, the jury would have discretion to provide a 
full defense (or, if imperfect self-defense is allowed, a partial defense) in both cases. 
 But perhaps this, too, is an acceptable result.  Courts and legislators should, when 
they create detailed rules of proportionality and necessity, and also when they create rules of 
mitigation such as imperfect self-defense, ensure that the ambit of the rules is principled and 
justifiable.  If Leonard’s example is troubling, then presumably we should secure equal 
treatment in the two scenarios and permit partial mitigation for that type of mistake of law. 
 Second, consider evolution.  Criminal law norms can change over time in a way that 
dramatically alters what counts as a M Fact.  A powerful example of the phenomenon is the 
rapid transformation of the law of rape and sexual assault in the last forty years.  In particular, 
it is worth examining the change in actus reus and mens rea standards with respect to 
nonconsent. 
 As noted in the introduction, the law in some jurisdictions has seen a remarkable 
evolution.  In broad outline, these jurisdictions first rejected traditional resistance 
requirements; then rejected any “force or threat of force” requirement, moving instead to the 
standard of “NO means NO” (i.e., verbal “resistance” suffices); and finally settled on the 
position that “Only YES means YES.”  Under New Jersey’s MTS case, for example, only an 
affirmative expression of willingness or permission to engage in the act of intercourse 
suffices as legal consent.57 
 This evolution was designed to be more protective than prior law of a victim’s right 
of sexual autonomy and right to be free of force, coercion, and violence.  It has been an 
evolution of actus reus requirements, not of mens rea requirements, at least as a formal 
matter.  That is, few jurisdictions have expressed their greater solicitude for the rights and 
needs of victims by lowering the mens rea requirement, or by grading sexual assault crimes 
by mens rea.  Rather, almost all have reduced the actus reus requirements, and many have 
created grades of sexual assault offenses, distinguished primarily by different actus reus 
requirements. 
To be sure, the traditional resistance requirement could partly be explained as a crude 
effort to require an especially culpable mens rea.  After all, anyone who persisted in 
intercourse when the woman was actively resisting had an especially blameworthy state of 
mind.  The “threat of force” requirement might be analyzed similarly. 
However, the elimination of these traditional requirements does not simply lower the 
required mens rea as to nonconsent (defined in an invariant way over time).  It also is widely 
                                                 
56 Leonard (2001: 590). 
57 State in the interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 
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understood to redefine the harm of rape—and as a necessary corollary, to redefine what 
constitutes legally adequate consent.  The law of rape now protects not just freedom from 
violence and from threats of force, but also freedom of choice about sexual intimacy. 
But what about the last step, from “NO means NO” to MTS, which essentially holds 
that “only YES means YES”?  Arguably, when a jurisdiction takes this step, it is really 
changing the mens rea requirement, not the actus reus.  The argument goes as follows. 
Although formally, MTS establishes a different and weaker actus reus requirement, 
substantively the law is really employing the same underlying conception of consent, and at 
the same time lowering the mens rea requirement.   MTS in effect says to the defendant: you 
are culpable as a matter of law if you take “silence” or ambiguous signals as legally valid 
consent. 
On this view, MTS is open to serious criticism, namely, the criticism that it requires 
far too little (indeed, perhaps it requires nothing) in the way of substantive mens rea as to 
nonconsent.58  For MTS seems to ignore the plain fact that someone could reasonably believe 
that the victim is consenting, yet violate the MTS rule.  If the victim says nothing, and is 
passive during the encounter, at least sometimes the defendant might reasonably believe that 
she is consenting. 
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that legally valid “consent” means 
something like “subjective desire or willingness to have intercourse, not induced by any type 
of threat.”  And in the view of such a skeptic, MTS is just a sneaky way of converting a 
negligent or even reasonable M Fact about “nonconsent” (so understood) into a M Law.  On 
this view, MTS conceals the fact that it really is imposing rape liability for the most 
attenuated degree of negligence, or even for a completely faultless mistake, as to 
“nonconsent.” 
That is how the argument goes.  But there is a counterargument.  The 
counterargument is that MTS really is about actus reus, not mens rea.  For MTS really does 
mean to require a different type of “consent” in order for intercourse to be legal—namely, an 
actual affirmative expression of permission.  So even if a woman is subjectively willing, her 
so-called consent is not legally sufficient if she does not affirmatively express this 
willingness. 
                                                 
58 Formally, MTS requires negligence, not strict liability, as to whether the victim expressed affirmative 
permission.   (The state “must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would not 
have believed that there was affirmative and freely-given permission.” Id. at 1279.)  But substantively, 
according to the argument under consideration, this is, or is close to, a strict liability rule, with respect to 
the victim’s nonconsent. 
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This is not a crazy idea.  In the context of medical consent, for example, we would 
not say that a patient legally consents to surgery that he had privately decided to undergo, if 
he hadn’t yet expressed that willingness to the surgeon!59 
At the same time, this approach is controversial.  It means a woman (or non-initiating 
person) cannot legally consent except by affirmatively stating her preferences.  This will to 
some extent diminish the power of individuals to have sexual relations on the terms they most 
prefer, since some might prefer that they did not have to express their affirmative permission.  
But, of course, the reply is that this is not too great a cost to bear, relative to the harms to 
victims who are genuinely unwilling and silent, and who, for a variety of reasons, are not able 
to, or do not, clearly say “no.”60 
 How, then, would the MTS approach apply to the scenario mentioned in the 
introduction?  Suppose a defendant, unaware of this new legal requirement, has intercourse 
with a victim who does not affirmatively express willingness, but who also does not verbally 
or physically protest.  Is his mistake about her nonconsent a M Fact or a M Law? 
 Clearly he has made a M Law, one that would ordinarily be irrelevant, even if a fact 
finder would judge it to be reasonable.  He does not realize that the actus reus of rape has 
changed, and, specifically, that the meaning of “nonconsent” has changed.  And there are 
defensible reasons, we have seen, for this evolution of the legal standard.  His claim of 
unfairness, while not frivolous, is not significantly different from similar claims of unfairness 
by actors who object to being convicted under other changed legal rules that they claim catch 
them by surprise. 
 From a broader perspective, a perfectly commonplace result of a change in the 
criminal law is this conversion phenomenon: a mistake that previously was a (legally 
relevant) M Fact becomes a (legally irrelevant) M Law.  MTS is unusual only insofar as one 
of the very purposes of the court’s new definition of legal consent was to preclude rape 
defendants from asserting certain kinds of M Fact.  More often, the conversion of M Fact into 
M Law is essentially a byproduct of the legal change.  For example, if a state makes it a crime 
for an adult to serve liquor to an underage person, some previous claims of M Fact (about 
whether one was thereby contributing to the delinquency of a minor, or whether one knew 
that the minor would drive drunk and cause harm) are now legally irrelevant.  Or if the state 
enacts a new criminal law forbidding driving while intoxicated, some previous claims of M 
Fact (e.g., about whether one was recklessly endangering others) again become irrelevant. 
                                                 
59 Schulhofer (1992: 74-75). 
60 Schulhofer (1998: 270). 
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 Finally, this conversion phenomenon does not undermine the fundamental distinction 
between M Fact and M Law.  To the contrary, it reveals the significance of that distinction.  
A change in criminal law norms almost always reflects a change in the duties, values, rights 
or interests that are enforced or protected by the criminal law, or at least a change in the type 
or degree of their enforcement or protection.  Silent victims of rape now deserve protection; 
adults now owe a more stringent duty to minors not to contribute to their intoxication; adult 
drivers now owe a duty not to drive intoxicated.  We should certainly expect, then, that such 




 The arguments in this paper have addressed conceptual and normative issues, but 
have scanted practical concerns.  There are, however, important reasons to hesitate before 
implementing some of the analysis into legal doctrine, especially when the analysis suggests 
broader attempt liability than current law provides.61  For example, even though Mr. Fact/ 
Mr. Law illustrates a context in which liability for a legally impossible attempt is in principle 
justifiable, there are pragmatic reasons not to recognize this narrow exception, as we have 
seen. 
 A final, skeptical question lurks in the background of this discussion.  Is the 
distinction between M Fact and M Law important only because so many jurisdictions hold on 
to the unjust view that ignorance of or M Law is never, or almost never, a defense?  If the 
answer is yes, then the obvious solution is to remedy the primary injustice.  I do favor a 
general requirement of fault as to the content of the criminal law, or at least a general defense 
of reasonable ignorance of or M Law.  But I deny the skeptic’s premise.  Even if all 
jurisdictions were to liberalize in this direction, it is highly unlikely (for reasons that I have 
explored above) that they would, or should, want to abolish all distinctions between M Fact 
and M Law, either when exculpating defendants from liability for completed crimes or when 
inculpating defendants for attempts.  This article tries to provide a precise analysis, in a wide 
range of contexts, of how the distinction should be drawn, why it runs into difficulties in a 
few narrowly circumscribed areas, and how those difficulties can (and why in some cases 
they cannot) be overcome. 
                                                 
61 See Simons (1990: 488-492 (suggesting caution before broadening attempt liability because of concerns 
about the unreliability of proof); Westen (2008: 550) (stating that he would not propose actual adoption of 
his broader view punishing culpable but legally impossible attempts because adoption would only rarely 
prevent injustices yet would generate serious difficulties). 
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